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Frontiersof Civil Liberties. By Norman Dorsen. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1968. Pp. ccvi, 420. $8.95.
By ny account, Norman Dorsen has compiled a creditable record as
law teacher and lawyer. Under his direction, the Arthur Garfield Hays
Civil Liberties Program at New York University Law School has
pointed the way to substantial curicular reforms in legal education,
broken down the barrier between thought and action in the study of
law, and greatly enriched the literature of both legal scholarship and
civil liberties litigation. This book is a sort of diary of Professor Dorsen's work as law teacher and civil liberties lawyer from 1961 to
1968. The materials in it include papers, memoranda, and abridged
texts of briefs (mostly in the Supreme Court) written by Professor
Dorsen, as well as transcripts of conferences on civil liberties subjects
moderated by him with contributions by men with as diverse views
as Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale, Professor Paul Bator of Harvard,
Professor Caleb Foote of Berkeley, and NAACP Counsel Robert Carter.
The subject matter of these materials is broad-free speech, academic
freedom, religious liberty, criminal justice, the Supreme Court and
constitutional adjudication, and racial and economic discriminationand their quality is uniformly high. The book reflects well the issues
of civil liberty which were before the Warren Court in the years it
covers.
Were I to criticize at all, it would be only to suggest that the
selection of materials ought not to have been limited to the work of
one lawyer or group of lawyers. In considering the sit-in cases, for
example, the Solicitor General's amicus brief in Bell, Boule, and Barr

t B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1966, University of California (Berkeley); Editor-in-Chief, SELCrTiVE
SFRvicF L. REP.
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in the 1963 Term' is doubtless the most penetrating historical study
of Jim Grow filed with the Court and deserves to be given a wider
audience. But it is really unfair to criticize this book by scoring its
concept. Frontiers of Civil Liberties so effectively represents the best
in civil liberties litigation of the past decade that it provides an excellent basis from which to evaluate the work of the constitutional
litigator in this period and to ask what role, if any, he has to play in
the years just ahead. We lawyers owe ourselves this critical evaluation,
for the social events to which civil liberties law and lawyers address
themselves have moved from the relative obscurity of a lunch counter
in Greensboro2 or a loyalty oath in FloridaO to dominate public attention and political discourse. Whatever this process may have done
for others, it has led me to take a more modest view than was fashionable several years ago of the constitutional lawyer's fitness to stand at
the center of the stage in the drama of important social change.
Lawyers, a sociologist once said, are the last of the generalists; he
meant that they were the last and only professionals to enjoy a comprehensive view of the society in which we live. He was wrong. Lawyers could be generalists, if they wanted to; their craft and the position it occupies in the lives of their fellow beings make it possible,
and perhaps even appropriate, that they should be. But lawyers are
by training and inclination "confined from molar to molecular mo-

tion. ' 4 Taking a perspective broader than the case at hand-and, indeed, only one side of the case at hand-is an art that most of them
never learn. To take one example, lawyers have for centuries been
making up history to fit this or that occasion, while judges, to establish premises for decision and justifications for new rules dressed up

in the guise of old, have put an imprimatur upon the crassest non1. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Griffin v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 130 (1964), Bar v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), Boule v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1954), Bell V. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), Robinson v. liorida, 878 Us.
153 (1964). The brief canvasses the history of Jim Crow and concludes that the actions
of the storekeepers and restaurateurs which led to the arrests of the petitioners.demonstrators were part of a "commuhity-wide fabric of segregation . .. filled with threads
of law and governmental policy woven by the State through a warp of custom laid
down by historic prejudice." Id. at 143. The brief is an eloquent statement of the "promise of Negro freedom" developed by Arthur Kinoy in The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom, 21 RurEks L. REV. 387 (1967). See diso Douglis, J., concurring inBell, 378 U.S.
at 242.
2. See NAIoAxAL AnvsoR-a Coz MsnlsoN oN CIVIL Di
1968) [hereinafter cited as KEneES CoMNIt'N REPORT].

soaS, REPRT 226.28 (Bantam ed.

3. CIrafmp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 US. 278 (1961).
4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes
made the remark in reference to common law judges, who he said were cabined by the
structure of the common law itself. That lawyers should be so confined is a product not
of the exigencies of their art, but of a self-induced smallness of vision.
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sense and called it history, or tradition. Lord Coke and the common
lawyers distorted our perspectives of English history all the way back
to Magna Carta and left us with myths from which, because many
of them are now enshrined in our jurisprudence and therefore safely
in the keeping of the courts, we will not be free short of revolutionary change. The reformers of the nineteenth century committed the
same offense with respect to English political history, and the process
continues to this day.
There is refreshingly little of this distortion of history in Professor
Dorsen's book, although the references to Magna Carta in the introductory chapter 5 and in the discussion of trial by jury0 betray an acceptance of the prevailing mythology concerning the historical importance of the Charter. 7 Lawyers are free in brief-writing to put
upon history any perspective that the court is likely to swallow, and
to rely on what some politically-motivated old lord once said in King's
Bench, the Exchequer, or the House of Lords as the authority for an
assertion of fact about an historical period remote from our own
and the old lord's. But when a scholar delineates the premises which
establish why a written constitution is preferable to an unwritten
one, or how we came to have trial by jury,8 he owes us more. I speak
emphatically not because Professor Dorsen's work gives me much
cause to do so, but because the extent of the malaise I am discussing
is demonstrated by a scholar of his attainments falling victim to it in
the course of a generally excellent work.
Lawyer's sociology is also a cause of some concern if the constitutional lawyer is accepted as central to the making and applying of
the rules which are fundamental to our law-life. 9 Caleb Foote observes

in the course of a discussion reprinted in this book: 10
The great stoic philosopher Epictetus in one of his writings
imagined himself facing a wrestler. The strong man boasted to
him "See my dumbbells," to which the philosopher impatiently
retorted, "Your dumbbells are your own affair. I desire to see
their effect." We should like to be able to supply this kind of
standard to our subject, to be able to see beyond the decisions of
5.

N.

DORSEN, FRONTIERS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

8 [hereinafter cited as

FRONTIERS].

6. Id. 234.
7. See Radin, The Myth of Magna Carta,60 HARv. L. REV. 1060 (1947).

8. FRONTIERS 3-21.
9. There are some exceptions. Edgar and Jean Cahn, advocates, researchers, teachers,
and scholars, come readily to mind when one thinks of lawyers' sociology and fact.gathering of high quality.
10. FRONTIERS 31.
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the Supreme Court and to gain a comprehensive picture of the
effect of the Court's custodianship of our civil liberties.
When we measure the effectiveness of a public health campaign such as that against polio or venereal disease, we can say
that the incidence of the disease ten years ago when the campaign
began was such and such; that now it is so and so; that the difference represents a measurable decline; and thus by the use of
controls we may be able to attribute that decline to certain specific factors. Such an empirical validation is as important for civil
liberties as for science. We all know from sad experience that
any form of government can hold out the promise of a bill of
rights, and that what is critical is to look behind the promise to
see if its principles are available in practice to most clients of the
police and of the criminal law.
Professor Foote's comments suggest two observations about attributes which the materials of Frontiers of Civil Liberties share with
much of the constitutional litigator's work in the years just past.
First, there is a distressing amount of conclusion-drawing from premises which lack empirical support. Second, the briefs and discussions
which led to the Supreme Court decisions of six, five, or even two
years ago do not give me the sense of a frontier's challenge: rather,
I realize how quickly the social events of the ensuing years have dated
the newly made rules, so that they can no longer guarantee the liberties they promised to make safe. I am led to wonder whether the lawyer's belief in "the law" as a universal solution to social controversya belief glowingly and ringingly asserted in urging the making of new
constitutional rules and the revitalization of old ones fallen into
desuetude-was in error. I consider these problem in turn.
First, as to argument from apparent empirical premises, consider
the amicus brief from the right to counsel case, Gideon v. Wainwright,
included in Frontiersas chapter 13.11 The brief argues that providing
counsel will not increase costs to the state and might even lower
them. To support this assertion, it states that providing counsel in
every criminal case will reduce postconviction applications premised
upon "real or fancied trial injustices resulting from the lack of trial
counsel," thereby saving litigation costs, and that prompt provision
of counsel will help to eliminate delays in the administration of justice, presumably by releasing defendants on bail more quickly, thereby
11.

372 U.S. 335 (1963). The brief in Gideon was written by Professor Dorsen and
FIao~rras in abridged form aL 193.

J. Lee Rankin and is included in
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saving detention costs. 2 Does the statement that costs will not increase
rest upon a calculation, even a rough calculation, of the number
of criminal cases tried each year and of the number of lawyers
available to try them? Has thought been given to the average cost
per hour of providing each criminal defendant with a lawyer, based
on an estimate of the number of hours it takes to prepare and try
the average criminal case?11 I doubt it, and the brief does not reflect
it. I am not criticizing the brief. It's a good brief, and I have written
just as broadly and just as baselessly in more than one case. But apparently no lawyer in raising the cost issue in Gideon, and no lawyer
in dismissing it, bothered to find out just what he was talking about.
Both sides dealt in broad-gauge argumentative assertions. (The same
vice is often found in the discussions of church and state: someday,
someone will tell me in terms other than ringingly Jeffersonian-or
Madisonian-,-just what is the point of the establishment clause in
contemporary America; then, by figuring out what evils lurk, sensible
rules can be fashioned to deal with them.) Much of the book's discussion of racial discrimination in public schools, including de facto
segregation, is similarly uninformed by analysis of the tensions which
underlie disputes about schools in urban areas.' 4 The conference on
de facto segregation reprinted in the book was held just after Harlem exploded in the summer of 1964, yet it dealt with the problem
before it as one of applying Brown v. Board of Education'5 to the
problems of New York City's schools, including even (for some participants) the psychological and sociological underpinning of Brown.
As stated in the introduction to the book, the conference made "the
tactical and policy choices which informed the briefs." What "information"? In retrospect how viable were the choices?
These defects are minor, however. I am principally concerned with
the view of the civil liberties frontiers and, impliedly, of the lawyer's role on those frontiers that one might gain from the book. I
turn, therefore, to the second point raised above; do the briefs which
secured yesterday's significant decisions instruct us about today's
problems? On reflection, I think not, even when the briefs in question
are, like those preserved here, among the best of their kind. This contention does not rest upon a distinction between "advocacy" and
207-09.

12.

FRONTIERS

13.

See generally

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,

IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS
14. FRONTIERS 333.

15.
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"scholarship," for there need not be such a distinction, provided one
informs his reader when he is arguing and when he is explaining.10
Rather, I think the truly challenging questions, the "frontier" questions about law and liberty, arise from events that occur at some
remove from the forum in which constitutional cases are argued and
are answered only by careful study of these events.
Consider the Gideon brief: it demolishes Betts v. Brady,1 7 the
"special circumstances" counsel case which Gideon overruled. The
brief and the paragraph of introductory material ably and perceptively
inform the reader how a civil liberties lawyer goes about distinguishing, and if he cannot distinguish, discrediting, a precedent which
stands squarely in the path of a new constitutional rule.18 At the conclusion of the abridged brief, there is a short paragraph summarizing
the Court's holding in Gideon and noting that the right to counsel
has since been extended to arraignments, police stations, and lineups.1 9 But the history of these developments, so quickly passed over,
is central to the meaning of Gideon; we cannot understand Gideon
unless we know the cases extending its rule into the police station.
Moreover, we cannot comprehend the frontiers of the right to counsel issue unless we understand what lawyers discovered about criminal justice when they went to the station houses and criminal courts
to represent indigents and unless we consider the practical effect of
Gideon and its progeny upon the fairness with which criminal justice
is administered. Now that a lawyer must be provided for everyone,
should we not inquire whether the malaise of our criminal courts
is more serious than the absence of counsel and of related procedural
rights? Perhaps the malaise extends to our use of the criminal courts
to sweep up society's refuse-to incarcerate those spen out by a
system increasingly unable to deal with its social problems except by
making their more violent (or, as in the case of public drunkenness,
aesthetically displeasing) manifestations the subject of punishment.
Or consider school segregation, housing discrimination, and sitins. The documents this book contains concerning these issues are a
1963 manual for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund field

16. I am, in principle, in accord with the suggestion of Justice Douglas that law
review authors representing special interest groups identify themselves as such when
writing in legal journals. See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WAsH. L
REV. 227 (1965).
17. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

18.

FRoNTERs

193-210.

19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (196);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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workers entitled "Demonstrations: How to Protest Within the Law", 20
the transcript of a conference on de facto segregation whose participants were civil liberties lawyers and law professors, 21 an American
22
Civil Liberties Union amicus brief in a voting discrimination case,
a 1967 paper on discrimination in private schools, 23 and a 1961 paper
on antitrust law aspects of housing discrimination. 24 Material of this
character cannot trace the frontiers of the questions it considers. In
part this is because later legal developments qualify, modify and
require re-evaluation of arguments in an area such as racial discrimination where demands and the manner in which they are presented
are quickly changing. Thus, in the material on sit-ins, there is no
2 G, concerning
mention of Brown v. Louisiana20 and A dderly v. Florida
de facto segregation, no mention is made of the implications of the
Hobson case,2 7 the recent statutory28 and judicial 29 changes in voting
law are not analyzed; and the Supreme Court's revival of a fair
housing law dating back to Reconstruction is not discussed.30
One ought, however, to raise questions even broader than those
posed by subsequent litigation and legislation. The Court's decisions
are rendered in specific historical contexts. To take an example,
the holding in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill3 ' that the prosecution
had "abated" is express recognition that historical events, here the
passing of a statute, had overtaken the issues in the case before the
Court could confront them. In many other ways, as well, the pressure
of events outside the Court has defined and redefined the frontier
problems for courts and lawyers.
The first lunch counter demonstration at Greensboro, on February
1, 1960,32 no longer looks to us as it did at the time. Today we view

it through the smoke and flame of Harlem, Watts, Newark, Detroit,
Washington, D.C., and scores more cities. Careful distinctions about
speech and trespass, about residential patterns, and about public
20. FRONTiS 161.
21. Id. 333.
22. Id. 317.
23. Id. 359.
24. Id. 377.
25. 383 US. 131 (1966).
26. 385 U.S. 39 (1966), discussed in Kipperman, Civil Rights at Armageddon-The Supreme Court Steps Back: Adderley v. Florida, 3 LAW IN TRANsmoN Q. 219 (1966).
27. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
28. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. II, 1965).
29. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). And see Judge Wisdor's devastating opinion in United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.La. 1963),
aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
30. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).

32.
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accommodations, seem somehow less than adequate to these events.
The litigator who, after reviewing his work, can tell us only that we
33
must bring new lawsuits in the mold of yesterday's should be asked
whether he really believes his solution can adequately deal not merely
with demands for justice grown more insistent of late, but with a
society which, as the Kerner Commission found, is permeated with
"white racism."3 4 In short, the liberties declared by the Supreme
Court cannot be understood from an examination of the briefs and
conferences that led to them. To some extent this is because the
conclusions these materials advance do not rest upon empirical data.
But apart from this we can understand the frontiers of civil liberties
only by following a rule from the moment of its birth in the Supreme
Court to its impact upon those for whom is was intended, thus determining how far it goes toward solving the problems to which it was
addressed. We might then ask whether the problem was properly
defined in the first place, or whether a different rule ought not
to have been sought. We might even ask whether the problem can be
solved by orthodox litigation strategies conducted within the framework of contemporary constitutional doctrine. This point is, I suggest, all the more urgent because today blacks in the cities and youths
on the campuses are asking whether the legal system can accommodate
just demands, whether it can even redeem the promises it makes.
Take, as an example, the 1968 disturbances at Columbia University
and the Cox Commission Report. 35 The authors of the Report concede that Columbia was permeated with cynicism, impersonality, and
arbitrariness; they admit that the institution's defects were so great
that one could understand, though not condone, the acts of the
students who rebelled. While the Report does not concede all of the
students' allegations against the university, (and one would not expect
it to), it does carefully document Columbia's self-proclaimed Manifest Destiny to expand into Harlem, the community be damned. It
is difficult to imagine how lawsuits could be fashioned to bring the
trustees and administration to account for their accumulated misdeeds. Yet the values for which the students fought at Columbia are
concerned with the most fundamental issue before us today: the
power of the people to control the decisions which determine the
33. FRoNtERs xxi: "Mlt may be years and even decades before persistent efforts crumble the illegal resistance and secure rights that previously were won only on paper.34. KEIRNER Co M'N REPORT passim.
35. FACT-FNDOG COMMISSION APPoNTED To INVEsTIGATE THE DisrtunAcEs AT COLUMBnA UNtvERSrrY IN APRM AND MAY 1968, CRIsiS AT COLUMBIA (195).
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content and rhythm of their lives and to call to account the wielders
of power in and out of government. If a lawyer had participated in
the events at Columbia, he would perhaps have helped the students
to frame their demands in the rhetoric of existing legal principles to
the extent that this could have been done. To the extent it could not,
he might have used his talents to define the kind of assertions about
social organization which were implicit in the students' demands for
change; in this role he would have been developing a counter-jurispru.
dence, or a jurisprudence of insurgency, elaborating justifications for
conduct which is outside the law as it exists and is interpreted today.
In addition, the lawyer-participant in the Columbia events would
have attempted to organize an effective legal defense for the movement
for change. He would not necessarily have defended the participants
in court, however, for one consequence of large-scale and significant
conflicts of the Columbia variety may well be that the participants
will acquire a deeper understanding of the principles at stake than
they will trust a lawyer to have, so that they (or some of them) will
want to defend themselves at trial.
Another possible legal response in the Columbia situation is "affirmative action"--making a number of the protesters plaintiffs and
placing their demands before the courts for decision. One difficulty
with this tactic is that the constitutional and legal principles which
can be invoked in such a suit cannot meet the students' central
demands. Also, the manner of the students' protest and the breadth
of their demands are often so repellant to the average judge that
their lawsuit is likely to be dismissed out of hand. 0 Finally, should
the suit survive a motion to dismiss, there is an unfortunate tendency
for a lawsuit of this kind to acquire a life of its own, possibly becom.
ing unresponsive to and independent of the goals of the movement
it seeks to serve. It tends to become the center of the movement and
even its purpose. In some contexts, it is wise for a lawsuit to play a
central role; lawsuits for desegregating schools and public facilities
were the principal organizational and political method for ending
racial discrimination in the South throughout the decade after Brown
v. Board of Education. In the context of a situation like that at Columbia, however, when a lawsuit fills this central role and then is tossed
out of court by an angry district judge, the defeat is debilitating
and seems more important than it probably is.
36. One can say this with some confidence in the case of Columbia, since the lawsuit
was dismissed out of hand. Crossner v. Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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I have dwelt upon Columbia because the issues which the students
raised and the institution against which they rebelled were more limited in scope and thus more easily comprehended than those that
are involved when the residents of our city ghettos unite to seek significant social change. But here, too, the lawyer must anal)ze the
demands being made and attempt to redefine them in terms of the
fundamental consitutional and democratic values which he a assert
on behalf of clients. He can further assist those pressing demands by
assessing the impact of particular tactics upon the government and
its agencies and by charting the extent to which governmental institutions can accede to these demands. His roles as advisor concerning the law as it is and advocate for the law as it should be do not
exhaust his capacity for useful service. The lawyer who claims a
place on the frontiers must listen to the voices of the people on the
streets and cast their demands as claims for justice in a jurisprudence
of insurgency.
I am suggesting, really, a new style of life and work for lawyers,
rooted elsewhere than in the law's traditional mythology. We must
take the Bill of Rights out of never-never land. Once upon a time
there was the American Revolution, and then came the Constitution
and some rights by amendment to it. Then there was a Civil War, resulting in many statutes and some explicit promises of freedom, duly
enshrined in constitutional amendments. The historical experience out
of which the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments were
fashioned was concrete and real to the authors of those amendments;
not so to us. Instead, we rely upon dim and distant historical perspectives, and increasingly consider the rights themselves as abstract concepts and play intellectual games with them. Define, redefine, decide,
distinguish, overrule, and dispute are the operative terms in this
process. Is it any wonder that at two place in his History of Western
Philosophy Bertrand Russell puts theology and law together as kindred
37
intellectual disciplines?
While the process of abstraction has gone on, the society for which
the abstractions were designed has fundamentally changed. Unfortunately, lawyers and judges know and take account of the changes
in far too many cases only by virtue of their own limited sets of
experiences. This state of affairs can not continue. Lawyers must
understand the life-styles of those who make these insistent claims for
justice. First, the lawyer must make legal and tactical decisions in
37. B. RussFL, A. HISToRY OF

VEsnERN PHILOSOPHY

199 (1945).
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the light of events around him. More important, he must assist in
the fashioning of a new jurisprudence which gives meaning, content,
force, direction and coherence to the demands of the young, the poor,
and the black discriminated against. As lawyers of this new generation leave the law schools to represent those who are pressing for
social change and who have been virtually unrepresented until now,
the experiences they share with their clients will give them insight
into the principles of social order which alone will accommodate
their clients' interests. Some of these principles can be advanced by
lawsuits cast in the traditional mold. Some require strategies designed
to influence decision makers other than courts-legislators, administrators, city officials. Others can be made into defenses in criminal
cases when demands for change confront unyielding authority. Still
others can be fashioned into jury speeches. There will yet remain
some principles which cannot be accommodated within the system,
and which await more fundamental change in our social condition
and a return to the equilibrium of opinions and institutions of
which Shelley spoke so eloquently. 38
We will learn to what extent the law can serve people's interests
and where it will betray them. I do not know where this process will
end, nor what discomfort we shall endure before it has run itself
out. I venture only that the frontiers are not in the courtroom any
longer, if indeed they ever were.
38. "The great writers of our own age are, we have reason to suppose, the companions

and forerunners of some unimagined change in our social condition or the opinions
which cement it. The cloud of mind is discharging its collective lightning and the equilibrium between institutions and opinions is now restoring, or about to be restored."
Shelley, Preface to Prometheus Unbound, as quoted in G.D. TomsoN, AESCIYLUS ANt)
ATHENs 344 (1st ed. 1941).
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